these initial concerns, however, U.S. policy toward Bolivia's revolutionary government was ultimately judged a success.
Traditionally, the United States had tended to be more sympathetic to governments that had come to power through a democratic process, adhered to liberal democratic principles, maintained a stable society, and opened their economies to U.S. economic interests. None of these criteria applied to Bolivia's MNR government. While the MNR had won a plurality of the popular vote in the 1951 election, its accession to power, initially blocked by the military, had been by force. Many civil liberties were suspended, and the program of the new government was militantly nationalist, particularly toward the "Big Three" tin-mining interests (Aramayo, Hochschild, and Patino), which included U.S. investors. Yet, these concerns gradually diminished as the level of U.S. influence over the government increased and the regime's priorities shifted dramatically.
THE U.S. RESPONSE TO THE REVOLUTION Former Bolivian Ambassador to the United States Victor Andrade, in his memoirs, described his country's situation immediately following the 1952 MNR revolution as follows (1976: 181):
Because of its landlocked position, our country is dependent on others. Our voracious neighbors not only isolated us from the rest of the world but, when important sources of wealth appeared, kept large portions of our territory for themselves.... We had dissipated our gold reserves, the nationalization of the mines proved expensive, and the costs of production and imports had increased sharply. The deficit was tremendous and the national budget reflected all of these misfortunes.
Under these circumstances, a revolutionary regime found itself confronting the economic power of the United States. The MNR leadership never really had a choice. From almost the beginning, the MNR's pragmatic wing recognized that no Bolivian revolution could afford to alienate the United States, not just because of the threat of direct intervention but also because of the possibility of economic retaliation, not unimportant given Bolivia's dependence on the United States to absorb its tin and provide needed imports. There was considerable pressure from within the MNR to moderate its policy and pursue reassuring the United States through diplomatic channels. As a result, President Victor Paz Estenssoro emphasized the limited nature of the revolution's goals and the need for continuity with previous governments (Malloy, 1970: 217) .
Even prior to the revolution, the embassy predicted-despite its history of antagonism toward the MNR-that "while aggressively nationalistic, self interest would... counsel going along with the United States" (NA 724.00/ 2-652).
Bolivia had traditionally been the poorest country in South America. Though potentially wealthy because of its mineral resources, it had remained poor largely because "the extractive industry had tied itself into a world market, and its supplier position in that system, along with elite control, essentially determined Bolivia's failure to utilize the enormous surplus from resource extraction for capital formation" (Scott, 1972: 50) . As the chief source of foreign aid for the hemisphere south of its border, the United States had on many occasions held the economy of Bolivia in the balance. This was particularly true in the years immediately following the MNR revolution.
The first question was recognition of the MNR by the U.S. government, a decision that had made the difference to the survival of a number of Latin American regimes. The first government to recognize the MNR junta-and for the first month the only government-was Guatemala, whose government consistently supported democratic revolutions against the old military oligarchs. The rest of the hemisphere appeared to be waiting for a decision from the United States, which was expected to have "a determining effect on the immediate political future of South America" because "the Bolivian coup d'etat is part of a political intrigue with ramifications in various other Latin American countries" (summary of telegrams, Truman Presidential Library, 1952).
The United States decided to delay both recognition and tin negotiations until it was clear that there would be no immediate nationalization of the mines or other measures harmful to U.S. interests in the region (NA 724.02/4-2152). In addition, Secretary of State Dean Acheson ordered the suspension of bilateral technical assistance and military missions, although he decided to continue Point IV assistance (NA 724.00/4-1252). Within a week, in the wake of assurances by the MNR on major areas of concern, the outlines of U.S. policy began to take shape. The State Department realized that the continued delay in recognition would not help the more moderate elements in the government and the continued delay "might augment [the] disadvantages of nonrecognition and start [to] operate against our own interest" (NA 724.00/ 4-2752). The embassy concurred, reporting that many believed that delay could hurt the moderates (NA 724.00/2-652), and, by the third week of May, after numerous consultations, Acheson acknowledged that continued withholding of recognition might have the effect "of strengthening the radical elements in the government" (U.S. Department of State, 1983: 492). The United States recognized the MNR government that month.
For the Bolivians, the most urgent need was food. Andrade (1976: 161) admitted that "only the assistance of the United States could avoid a repetition of the famine which had occurred in our country during the War of the Pacific." The United States offered US$9 million in famine relief and other essential commodities, the start of a process that would make Bolivia the largest recipient of food aid per capita in the world (Dunkerley, 1984: 81-82 Sir John Lomax, the British ambassador to Bolivia, interpreted these initial diplomatic attitudes toward the MNR government as evidence of the need to show Bolivia's rulers that they needed American help (Whitehead, 1969: 8) . Up to this point, the United States was making spot purchases of tin but refusing to sign a long-term contract. Its aid was enough to prevent the country from falling into chaos but not to get the economy on its feet (NA 724.0 MSP/10-2353). More substantial aid would be forthcoming, but at a price. The MNR's final decision to expropriate rather than confiscate the mines-despite immense pressure from the miners and other Bolivians for the latter option-was directly related to its recognition that some form of compensation was necessary to avoid being labeled communist and denied both aid (Whitehead, 1969: 8) The importance of this pressure was confirmed by William P. Hudson of the State Department's Office of South American Affairs (OSA), who noted (NA 724.00/1-1453) that "it was due entirely to United States efforts that the inevitable nationalization of most of the country's mining industry took a form which recognized the principle of compensation, despite strong popular and official feeling that the mine owners were not entitled to any payment." Indeed, the expropriation included provisions that made it possible for the nationalized mine industry to invite foreign mining interests to exploit and develop new deposits (Whitehead, 1969: 8) .
COMPENSATION AND DEPENDENCE ON EXPORTS
Rebecca Scott argues that such a condition was inevitable given that Bolivia had no smelting capability and one of the former mine owners had substantial interests in a British smelting operation, the only non-U.S. smelter capable of accepting the low-grade Bolivian ore. When the Russians offered to build a smelter for the Bolivians, the United States threatened to withdraw aid (Scott, 1972 Similarly, the moderate direction of the land reform was attributed to the U.S. National Security Council's aim to "combat Communist agrarian reform by encouraging land development of our type" (Operations Coordinating Board Central File 091.4 Latin America [File #1(5)]). In addition to a stronger anti-communist stance and compensation of the former owners, the United States also insisted that aid be supervised by U.S. officials at all levels (Wood, 1969: 10) .
This generous aid did not mean that Bolivia was ready to go it alone. That same month, OSA official John L. Topping informed his State Department colleagues that the embassy in La Paz had pointed out that Bolivia's foreign exchange earnings from its tin, on which, he emphasized, it was solely dependent, were insufficient to meet the population's most basic needs and that only U.S. aid had prevented the country's total collapse (NA 724.00/1-2654). A report of the Bolivian Planning Board noted that U.S. aid "represented a means only of preventing worse deterioration in the situation as it existed" (Wood, 1969: 24) .
As a result, in subsequent years, it was possible to extract even greater economic concessions. For example, the Petroleum Code of 1955, written by Americans and enacted without any public debate or alterations by the Bolivian authorities, forced the Bolivian government to forgo its oil monopoly (Whitehead, 1969: 11) . Offers by the Soviet Union to assist Bolivia with its nationalized oil industry were met by a threatened withdrawal of U.S. aid (Scott, 1972: 54) . Similarly, the United States and Bolivia signed an agreement in 1955 to encourage foreign investment (Blasier, 1985: 78) . It was only because of the desperate need for additional sources of foreign exchange and pressure from the U.S. government that the once strongly nationalistic MNR agreed to these concessions (Alexander, 1958: 168-169) .
By this time, it appears, the United States had effective veto power over even the composition of the Bolivian cabinet. Lechin resigned as Minister of Mines when Congress was considering continuing aid to Bolivia, a move that Bolivians later claimed had been an explicit condition. It is believed that he would have made a bid for the presidency in 1956 had he not recognized the need for continued U.S. assistance; indeed, he may have preferred that Paz Estenssoro's vice-president, Hernan Siles Zuazo, rather than himself bear the disgrace of implementing American orders (Whitehead, 1969: 18) .
The following year, the United States took more direct control over Bolivia's economy with the appointment of George Jackson Eder to head an economic stabilization program-a decision, according to Eder (1968: 479) , that the MNR government made "virtually under duress, and with repeated hints of curtailment of U.S. aid." Eder was executive director of the Stabilization Commission, every member of which had to be "persona grata to the U.S. embassy." The program, which bore a striking resemblance to the structural adjustment programs that have since been imposed on dozens of debtridden countries in Latin America and elsewhere, consisted of the following (Scott, 1972 : 55):
The boliviano was devalued, and export/import controls were removed. Price controls and government subsidies on consumer goods were removed, while wages and salaries were frozen. To reduce government spending, educational outlays were slashed, the program of colonizing the lowlands was stopped, and efforts at industrial diversification were halted. Practically all social welfare allocations were terminated.
For example, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Rubottom said in reference to one Bolivian development plan, "We had to tell the Bolivian Government that they couldn't put their money into it and we weren't going to put ours into it" (U.S. House of Representatives, 1960: 847).
Though nominally a technical adviser, Eder, a strong advocate of monetarism, believed that Bolivia would have been better off leaving the economy entirely in the hands of private enterprise. He was contracted and paid by the U.S. government at the behest of the International Monetary Fund to acquire direct administrative control of the economy (Dunkerley, 1984: 86) . This gave the U.S. government unprecedented power to control the course of the Bolivian revolution.
Eder has written a detailed account of how he-as an agent of the U.S. government-was able to implement a program which, in his own words, "meant the repudiation, at least tacitly, of virtually everything that the Revolutionary Government had done over the previous four years." Eder explained that his goal was to convince the new MNR administration that stabilization would be possible only through a total transition to a free market economy (1968: 87-88). He insisted that government business be returned to private hands, that compensation be guaranteed in the event of any future nationalizations, and that all price controls be repealed (Scott, 1972: 55 ). Eder's prescription for the favorable investment climate that he considered necessary was a stable political environment, a strong currency, and labor conditions that minimized the risk of interference from labor or political leaders (Eder, 1968: 695) .
Furthermore, there was never any doubt about the fate of the revolution should the MNR refuse: "I suggested that they had better make their plans on the basis of what Assistant Secretary Holland had specifically told all of them" or it would be "extremely difficult" for them to receive further U.S. aid (Eder, 1968: 159) . Similar pressures, predicted Eder (1968: 141, 143), would provide the leverage that would be needed later to obtain enactment of certain rather drastic measures, necessary for monetary stabilization but hardly popular or politically easy.... There would be no difficulty in getting Bolivia to agree in advance to conditions that would ensure a return to a free enterprise economy.
The effect was not only to redirect the economic priorities of the revolution but to alter the revolution's political structure by effectively curbing the power of the trade unions and displacing socialist-leaning leaders of the MNR. This was important because it had become clear to American officials that there had to be some changes in the internal structure of Bolivian politics. Indeed, as Susan Eckstein (1976: 33) observed, "ever since the government initiated the basically anti-labor stabilization program in 1956, post-revoluU.S. diplomats and technicians were "quite free to give them political advice" (Alexander, 1982: 93) . Even the more conservative elements of the party had serious reservations about this level of dependency, but they believed they had no alternative (Dunkerley, 1984: 85) . According to Wood (1969: 24-25) , an aura of dependence and ineffectuality had enveloped the regime and sapped its legitimacy. Unrealized aspirations and the mere passage of time had blunted the fervour of popular commitment. The government had progressively exhausted its symbolic, regulative, and extractive capabilities.... The regime was now dependent for its day-to-day operation and its very existence on the "external derivative power" provided by the aid.
As the revolution turned to the right under the Siles Zuazo administration (1956) (1957) (1958) (1959) (1960) and Paz Estenssoro's second term, beginning in 1960, the massive popular base of support that had previously protected it from right-wing and traditional elements evaporated.
CONCLUSION
Blasier (1985: 53) has argued that "the Bolivian Revolution is the only genuine social revolution to which the United States provided early and sustained support" and that "the United States was deeply involved for a dozen years in making the Bolivian Revolution 'work."' What he does not address is for whom it was made to work, other than to acknowledge that the United States had a goal "of moderating or deradicalizing the revolution." Though he persuasively argues that the MNR government during this period did represent an authentic revolution, he also acknowledges that "from the beginning U.S. influence has tended to check the nature and extent of revolutionary change" (1985: 101) .
In the end, the United States was able to overthrow the revolution without having to overthrow the government. The reality of a high level of dependency made it possible for the United States to steer the course of the revolution in a direction more favorable to its interests-a move facilitated by the MNR's predominant middle-class orientation and the inability of its more radical factions to dominate it. While the revolution succeeded in undermining much of the old order by breaking up the hacienda system and nationalizing the tin mines, it never succeeded in developing a new order to take its place. This made it possible, in the words of Anthony Freeman of the State Department's Bolivia desk, for the United States "to channel the revolution in constructive directions" (Scott, 1972: 53).
The United States chose to influence the direction of the MNR through large-scale financial support to the revolutionary government. Indeed, its influence over the Bolivian government was greater than it had been prior to the revolution, since the old ruling class-tied to the tin barons-had been in conflict with the United States over the price of tin (Whitehead, 1969) 
